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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The initial parties to this action included plaintiff
John

Wagner

Associates,

dba

Grabber

Utah,

Hercules, Inc. and Modulaire Industries, Inc.

and

defendants

Prior to trial,

defendant Modulaire Industries Inc. and plaintiff John Wagner
Associates, dba Grabber Utah settled their disputes.
Modulaire

Industries

Inc.

is therefore

not

Defendant

a party

to this

appeal.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This

Court

has

jurisdiction

pursuant

to

the

Utah

Supreme Court's Order of Transfer to the Court of Appeals, dated
January 10, 1989. The Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3) (j) , and has discretion to transfer this appeal pursuant to Rule 4A of the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
This appeal is from an Order granting a Motion for Summary Judgment

filed

plaintiff-appellants

by defendant-respondent
John

Wagner

Associates'

Hercules
First

wherein

Claim

for

Relief for mechanic's lien foreclosure was dismissed, and from a
final Judgment

following

trial dismissing

plaintiff-appellant

John Wagner Associates' Second Claim for Relief for failure to
obtain a payment bond.

Both the Order and the final Judgment

were issued by Judge Noel of the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court correctly found that

the placing of leased mobile office units constituting Annexes 15
and 16 on the Navy's land by Hercules pursuant to its lease with
Modulaire does not

constitute the construction, addition to,

alteration or repair of a building, structure, or improvement
upon land as required by the Utah Contractors1 Bond statute, Utah
Code Ann, § 14-2-1 et seg. (1986).
2.

Whether the district court correctly found that

Hercules, by virtue of its placing of leased mobile office units
constituting Annexes 15 and 16 on the Navy's land pursuant to its
lease with Modulaire, is not subject to the provisions of the
Utah Contractors' Bond statute, Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 ejt seg.
(1986).
3.

Whether the district court correctly found that

Hercules' use of the Navy's land constitutes an interest which is
not sufficient to be attached under the Utah Mechanics' Lien
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 et. seg. (1974 and Supp. 1986)

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The

two determinative

forth in Addendum A hereto.

statutory

provisions

are set

They are Utah's Mechanics' Lien

statute, Utah Code Ann. 1f 14-2-1 et seg. (1986) and Utah's Contractors' Bond statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1974 and Supp.
1986).
-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
On December 5, 1985, plaintiff-appellant John Wagner

Associates,

d/b/a

Grabber

Utah

(hereinafter

referred

to

as

"Wagner") recorded a Notice of Lien against an alleged interest
of Hercules in the Navy's property with the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1, et, sea.
(R. 15-17).

The lien arose out of the failure of a non-party

subcontractor to pay Wagner for the supplying of materials used
in completing

the interiors of mobile office units owned by

defendant Modulaire Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Modulaire")
and

used

by defendant-respondent

Hercules,

Inc.

(hereinafter

referred to as "Hercules") pursuant to a lease and placed on land
owned by the United States Government.

(R. 15-17).

Wagner sub-

sequently filed this action for breach of a joint-check agreement
against defendant Modulaire, and for failure to obtain a payment
bond under Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 ejt seq. and for foreclosure of
the mechanic's lien against Hercules.

(R. 2-11).

(The contrac-

tual relationships are depicted in Addendum B hereto.)
The parties submitted various motions for summary judgment and memoranda in support thereof.

On March 22, 1988, Judge

Noel granted Hercules' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment with
respect to Wagner's First Claim for Relief for mechanic's lien
foreclosure.

(R. 509-512).

Judge Noel found that, since the

interest of Hercules in the Navy's property was not alienable,
-3-

Hercules'

interest

was

therefore

insufficient

to

allow

for

attachment under the Utah Mechanics1 Lien statute, Utah Code Ann.
S 38-1-1 et seq.
denied

Hercules'

(R. 509-512) •
Motion

for

In the same order Judge Noel

Summary

Judgment

and

Hercules'

Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment concerning the Second Claim
for Relief for failure to obtain a payment bond, concluding that
the

factual

issues

relating

to

the

kind

and

nature

of

the

improvements were reserved for trial.

(R. 509-512).

concluded

issues of material fact

that there existed genuine

Judge Noel

bearing on Wagner's Third Claim for Relief, joint-check agreement, against defendant Modulaire.

(R. 509-512).

Prior to trial, Wagner and Modulaire entered

into a

Stipulation of Dismissal and an Order of Dismissal, settling all
causes of action between them.

(R. 619-621).

Trial took place on July 12, 1988.

The only cause of

action remaining at trial was against Hercules for failure to
obtain a payment bond pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 ej: seq.
(R. 640, p. 9). At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court
found that Wagner had no cause of action against Hercules under
Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 (1986) for goods supplied by Wagner to a
subcontractor of Modulaire for use in finishing the interiors of
these leased mobile office units constituting Annexes 15 and 16.
(R. 630-631).

The trial court determined that the placing of

these mobile office units leased from Modulaire on the Navy's
land by Hercules did not constitute the construction, addition
-4-

to, alteration or repair of a building, structure or improvement
upon

land

as

required

by

§ 14-2-1, Utah

Code

Ann,

(1986).

(R. 628). The trial court also determined that Hercules, by virtue of its placing these leased mobile office units on the Navyfs
land, was not subject to the provisions of S 14-2-1 (1986) and
that Hercules therefore had no obligation to obtain a bond for
the benefit of Wagner.

(R. 628).

Findings of Fact and Conclu-

sions of Law were entered by the trial court on August 24, 1988.
(R. 623-629).
B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Hercules is unwilling to accept Wagner's version of the

Statement of the Facts because of their argumentative nature and
because of the lack of cites to the Record.

Hercules sets forth

its Statement of the Facts as follows:
1.

Hercules

produces

missiles

on

land

called

the

Bacchus Works, part of which is comprised of land owned by the
United State Government and over which the Navy has jurisdiction,
(R. 234, Exhibit 2; R. 248-249; R. 640, p. 104).
2.

The Navy land is used by Hercules pursuant to an

Award/Contract which allows Hercules to use the land without making payment for its use so long as Hercules uses the land for
work on government contracts.
3.

(R. 639, p. 31).

Modulaire's Salt Lake City office has, either in

storage at its facilities or placed at various locations in the

-5-

western United States, 461 mobile office units for lease as temporary facilities for its customers.
4.

(R. 640, p. 90).

On June 7, 1985, Hercules gave a Purchase Order to

Modulaire under which Modulaire agreed to lease mobile office
units to comprise two mobile office complexes, known as Annex 15
and Annex 16, for Hercules1

use for a period of 24 months.

(R. 640, p. 53, Exhibit 64).
4.

The Purchase Order included charges for disman-

tling and returning the leased mobile office units. (R. 218).
Each mobile office unit is 14f x 60 f ; Annex 15

5.

consists of 19 units; Annex 16 consists of 11 units.

(R. 640,

p. 69-70, Exhibit 71) .
6.

The 30 units which comprise the mobile office com-

plexes were delivered by Modulaire to land owned by the United
States Navy and used by Hercules pursuant to its Award/Contract
with the Navy.
7.

(R. 234).
When

delivered

by

Modulaire

to

Hercules,

the

mobile units were finished exteriorly but did not have finished
interiors.

(R. 640, p. 75-76).
8.

Modulaire contracted with Space Building Systems

to perform the interior finishing of the units using demountable
partitioning.
9.

(R. 170, Exhibit 4).
Space

Building

Wagner for materials used
units.

Systems

awarded

in completing

(R. 443).
-6-

the

a

contract

to

interiors of the

10.

Hercules never contracted with Space Building Sys-

tems or with Wagner to perform work on the units.

(R. 640,

p. 105-106).
11.

On October 10, 1985, Space Building Systems filed

for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
(R. 443).
12.

Wagner was not paid in full by Space Building Sys-

tems before Space Building Systems was granted protection under
the United States bankruptcy laws.
13.

(R. 443).

Modulaire paid in full all sums due and owing to

Space Building Systems for the work performed on the interiors of
the trailers.
14.

(R. 171; R. 640, p. 12).
Wagner made demand for payment from Modulaire and

Hercules, and upon their refusal to make payment for the materials, Wagner filed a Notice of Lien against an alleged interest of
Hercules

in

the Navy's

property

with

the

Salt

Recorder, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31-8-1 et sea.
15.
tember, 1985.
16.

County

(R. 443).

Hercules began using Annex 15 and Annex 16 in Sep(R. 640, p. 57).
Hercules

extended

office complexes to April, 1989.
17.

Lake

its

lease of

the two mobile

(R. 640, p. 57).

The units are delivered by being towed on the open

highway and, when at the site, are stabilized on gravel upon
which a wooden pallet

is placed and upon that several cinder

-7-

blocks to create a dry stack; channel beams which form the floor
of the unit rest on the dry stack,
18.

(R. 235; R. 640, p. 113).

Each unit has its own heating, ventilation, and

air conditioning unit and its own individual electrical panel
which is fed from a main panel setup for the annex; each unit is
entirely self contained.
19.

(R. 640, p. 70).

Once stabilized on the cinder block piers, the

wheels are removed and stored for future use in removing the
mobile units from the site.
20.

The

ceiling

(R. 235).
trusses

and

floor

beams

of

units

adjoined to form the annex are bolted together, but not welded
together.

(R. 640, p. 77). At the lines where units are joined

together, commonly known as mod lines, a piece of metal is placed
to hide the mod line on the exterior.
71).

(R. 640, p. 73, Exhibit

Skirting is placed around the base of the annex to hide the

cinder block piers.

(R. 640, p. 113, Exhibit 86). Wooden steps

are placed at the door of each unit to provide access.

(R. 640,

p. 112, Exhibit 84). The wooden steps are not attached or fixed
to the ground.
21.
ground.

Id.
The mobile

units

are

in no way

fixed

to the

(R. 640, p. 112-115).
22.

When

one

of

the

units

is

manufactured

at

Modulaire's facilities, a Manufacturer's Statement of Origin is
provided to the sales office which then applies to the State of
Utah to license the mobile unit as a mobile home.
-8-

The unit is

thereafter taxed to Modulaire as personal property.

Each year

when personal property taxes are paid to the county in which the
trailer
sticker,

is located, the State of Utah

issues a mobile home

Modulaire obtains a license plate for each unit which

is used when the unit is transported across the open highways.
(R. 640, p. 82-87, Exhibits 118-122, 127-128).
23.

Modulaire pays personal property tax on each of

the leased units to the State of Utah through the Department of
Motor Vehicles.
24.

(R. 640, p. 84, Exhibits 118, 119).

Hercules, either through its own crews or by the

use of contractors other than Wagner, prepared the sites for
Annexes 15 and 16 by bringing

in electrical

lines and sewer

lines, and by preparing the earth, but without laying cement
foundations.
25.

(R. 639, p. 11; R. 640, p. 119).
Located near Annexes 15 and 16 were Annexes 9 and

10 which also consisted of a complex of mobile office units
bolted together, one supplied by Modulaire and the other supplied
by another supplier.

These annexes were removed from the Navy's

property at the close of the lease on them.

(R. 640, p. 114-120,

Exhibits 69, 95-117).
26.

For removal, the skirting was removed, the metal

strip along the mod line was removed, the bolts through the ceiling trusses and between the floors of the various units were
removed, each unit was jacked up, the cinder block dry stacks
were removed, the wheels were placed back on the unit, a towing
-9-

tongue was placed on the unit, and the unit was removed to the
central parking lot by a small tractor for pickup and removal
from the site by a semi-tractor.

(R. 640, p. 114-120, Exhibits

95-117).
27.

Removal

of

the mobile

office

units

comprising

Annexes 15 and 16 at the close of the lease term would be done in
substantially the same manner as the removal of Annexes 9 and 10.
(R. 640, p. 120).
28.
purposes.

The Navy's land could be used for a variety of

(R. 640, p. 120-121).
29.

The Modulaire office units comprising Annexes 15

and 16 are placed on the Navy's land temporarily.

(R. 640,

p. 54, 106-107).
30.

Hercules did not intend to place the buildings on

the Navy's land permanently.

(R. 640, p. 106-107).

Hercules makes the following observations with respect
to the facts as set forth by Wagner.

The paragraphs numbered

here correspond to Wagner's numbered paragraphs under the heading
"Statement of Facts."
1.

Wagner did not supply "construction materials for

the construction of approximately 25,000 square feet of office
space".

Wagner only supplied materials to finish the interior of

mobile office units.
2.
office

units.

(R. 443) .

No office space was "constructed" with 30 modular
There

was

in

fact

-10-

no

construction

at

all.

Hercules

chose

temporary

mobile

office

units, as opposed to

erecting a building, to satisfy its temporary needs for space.
(R. 640, p. 107, 177).
12.

Hercules

never

entered

into

a

contract

with

Modulaire "for the construction of certain office complexes on
property".

The contract between Hercules and Modulaire was for

the lease of mobile office units.

(R. 640, p. 69-70, Exhibit

71).
13.

Modulaire never entered into a contract with Space

Building Systems to provide labor and materials "in the construction and improvement of the office complexes."

Modulaire con-

tracted with Space Building Systems to perform interior finishing
in the mobile office units.
24.

(R. 170, Exhibit 4).

Mr. Waring never testified regarding "the tenor"

of Specification No. 9106.
29.

It is bizarre, to say the least, that Wagner would

rely on the testimony of its attorney for the factual underpinning for its claim.

The only legitimate use made of the affida-

vit of Kurt Faux was to authenticate the photographs taken by him
for use at trial to which Hercules did not object.
33.

The Award/Contract under which Hercules uses the

property does not grant Hercules "wide-range use and control of
all the 'facilities'".
34.

This statement is merely argumentative.

Hercules did not spend "one-half million dollars

for the office complexes".

Hercules spent money to lease the
-11-

mobile office units from Modulaire for a limited duration of
time; Hercules never paid for improvements to the property. (R.
640, p. 53, Exhibit 64).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court correctly found as a matter of fact
after trial that the placing of leased mobile office units constituting Annexes 15 and 16 on the Navy's land by Hercules pursuant to its lease with Modulaire did not constitute the construction, addition to, alteration or repair of a building, structure,
or improvement upon land as required by Utah's Bond statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 14-2-1 et sea. (1986), and, thus, as a matter of law
that Hercules is not within the class of persons subject to the
provisions of Utah's Bond statute, § 14-2-1 et. seer. (1986).
Modulaire's trailers have not become part of the Navy's
land by virtue of Hercules' contract with Modulaire.

Materials

become an integrated part of real property only when annexed to
the land or made a part of some permanent structure on the land.
In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court discussed a tripartite test
to be used in distinguishing between real and personal property
for

the

occurred.

purposes

of

establishing

whether

a

conversion

has

The three factors articulated by the Court are: (1)

The manner in which the item is annexed to realty; (2) Whether
the item is adaptable to the particular use of the realty; and

-12-

(3) The intention of the annexor to make an item a permanent part
of the realty.
In the instant case, the mobile office units have not
been "annexed" to the realty.

The removability of the units was

contemplated by the parties in the express terms of the lease.
In fact, the evidence showed that trailers almost identical to
the trailers in this litigation had already been removed from the
premises.
necting

The subject trailers were easily removable by discon-

the pipes, reinstalling

the wheels, and pulling them

away, just as had been done previously with other trailers. They
are, after all, nothing more than trailers.
The Mueller court determined that an item is "adaptable" to the particular use of the realty when it is integrated
into real property to further a specific purpose for which the
real property has been devoted.

The court stated, however, that

personal property located on real property that is adaptable to
multiple uses does not become "adapted" simply because the presence of the personal property determines the use of the real
property at a particular time.

In the instant case, the property

was vacant and highly adaptable to multiple uses.

Placing these

trailers on the property did nothing to further any specific purpose for which the property could be devoted.

The trailers are

used as temporary offices and do not have any special integration
with the real property.

The adaptation prong of the Mueller test

has therefore not been met.
-13-

Another important prong of the Mueller test is whether
the parties intended the property to be personal property or real
property.

In this case, the "intention" of the parties to retain

the personal property characteristics of the units is strongly
supported by the transaction documents•

The written quote from

Modulaire to Hercules was for mobile office units, specifying
both setup and dismantling charges.

In addition, each trailer is

required to have a Manufacturer's Statement of Origin and to have
a Motor Vehicle License under Utah law.

Since each trailer is

classified as a motor vehicle by the Department of Motor Vehicles, each unit is issued a license plate and a certificate of
title, and is thereafter taxed as personal property,,

None of the

three requirements set forth by the Mueller court have been met
in this case.
The district court also correctly found that Hercules
is not subject to Utah's Mechanics1 Lien statute.

The remedy in

a mechanic's lien action is for the court to sell the owner's
interest in the property in order to satisfy the liens and the
cost

incurred

by

the

lienholder.

The

threshold

issue with

respect to the lien statute is, therefore, the availability of an
interest in land which can be judicially sold.

Hercules has no

interest in the Navy's land which could possibly be sold at a
sheriff's sale or other judicial sale.

Hercules uses the land

without any lease, but pursuant to an Award/Contract.

Hercules

is allowed to use the land so long as it uses the land for work
-14-

on government contracts,

Hercules does not own the land and it

has no interest in the land to which a mechanic's lien could
attach.

Consequently, the district court correctly found as a

matter of law that Hercules' interest in the land is not alienable and that it is not sufficient to be attached under the Utah
Mechanics' Lien statute, Utah Code Ann, S 38-1-1 et. seq.
Even if Hercules were subject to the mechanics' lien
statute as a matter of law, as a matter of fact the mobile office
units were not annexed to the land and thus the requirements of
the statute are not satisfied.

This Court should therefore

affirm both the district court's Order and its Judgment.
ARGUMENT
I
THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY WAGNER IN THIS APPEAL IS
NOT AVAILABLE.
The trial court's findings of fact were not clearly
erroneous and its conclusions of law were completely correct.
The lack of foundation for this appeal becomes apparent when the
relief sought by Wagner from this Court is studied.
The only issues pertaining to the bond statute relate
to the legal determination made by the trial court that Hercules'
having placed leased mobile office units comprising Annexes 15
and 16 on the Navy's land did not constitute the construction,
addition to, alteration or repair of a building, structure, or
improvement upon land, and that Hercules is not a person subject
-15-

to the provisions of the bond statute.

The trial court wanted to

hear evidence regarding the placement of the mobile office units
on the Navy's land so that it could make both the appropriate
factual determination and the appropriate legal determination.
There are two issues to be considered under the mechanics1

lien statute.

The first issue under the mechanics1 lien

statute is one of law.

Even if the facts were sufficient to sup-

port annexation of the mobile trailers onto the Navyfs land,
nonetheless, as a matter of law the summary judgment must stand
because Hercules has no interest in the property which can be
foreclosed

upon.

The second

issue

is of a factual nature.

Wagner would have this Court reverse the summary judgment granted
Hercules by the trial court and "remand for further proceedings
in the foreclosure of the Mechanic's Lien."

(Brief, p.35).

If

the case were remanded, the only factual issues that could be
determined would be those that have already been fully determined
by the trial court after trial on the issues presented under the
bond statute.

Thus, if this Court sustains the trial court's

factual findings with respect to the annexation issue under the
bond statute, there would be absolutely no reason to remand this
case on the mechanic's lien issue because the facts will automatically have been

found against Wagner's position.

In other

words, there is no remedy for Wagner under the mechanics' lien
statute, as is discussed herein.

-16-

II
THE STANDARDS OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE
ARE NOT IN DISPUTE.
Utah's Mechanics1 Lien statute and Contractors' Bond
statute are similar in nature, similar in language and identical
in purpose.

The mechanics' lien statute provides that persons

furnishing materials used in the construction or improvement of
any building, structure, or improvement to any premises shall
have a lien on the property for which they furnish materials.

A

lien granted under this statute can only attach to such interest
as the owner may have in the property.
et seq. (1974 and Supp. 1986).

Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-3

Similarly, the Contractors' Bond

statute provides that the owner of any interest in land entering
into a contract for the construction or improvement of any building, structure or improvement upon land shall obtain from the
contractor a bond conditioned for the faithful performance of the
contract and prompt payment for materials furnished and labor
performed under the contract.

Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 et. seq.

(1986).
The parties agree that the statutes are read i_n pari
materia and are applied equally and consistently to the same fact
situation.

The similarity between the mechanics' lien statute

and the contractors' bond statute was noted long ago by the Utah
Supreme Court in Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167
P.241 (1917), in which the court upheld the constitutionality of

-17-

Utah's Bond statute.

_Id. at 128, 167 P. at 246.

Both of these

statutes apply to (1) owners of an interest in land (2) for construction, additions, alterations, or repairs to any building,
structure, or improvement on the land.

In Rio Grande Lumber Co.,

the Supreme Court noted that the Utah Bond statute "is auxiliary
to our mechanic's lien law, and just as much in aid of it as if
it had been made a part of it and incorporated in the same chapter."

Id. at 124, 167 P. at 245.
The standard for review of the trial court's Findings

of Fact is set forth in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).

It

provides, in pertinent part:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. . . .
This Court has recently upheld this standard in Butler v. Lee,
108 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

See also State

v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-193 (Utah 1987).

In Walker, the

Utah

Supreme

Court quoted

Wright

& Miller

in defining

standard:
The appellate court . . . does not consider
and weigh the evidence de novo.
The mere
fact that on the same evidence the appellate
court might have reached a different result
does not justify it in setting the findings
aside.
It may regard a finding as clearly
erroneous only if the finding is without adequate evidentiary support or induced by an
erroneous view of the law.
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alteration or repair of any building, structure, or improvement
upon land under the bond statute.
mechanics1

But the bond statutes and the

lien statutes are read jjx pari materia,

Therefore,

good guidelines exist in determining whether personal property
has become annexed to real property.

The trial court reserved

the issue for trial so that, by reference to the statute, the
court could determine whether Hercules was a person contracting
for the construction, addition to, alteration or repair of any
building, structure, or improvement upon land.
Wagner suggests that Hercules should somehow be bound
by the agreement between Modulaire and Space Building Systems.
However, no party to this appeal was in fact a party to that
contract and it is not at issue in this case.
fact

that

Modulairers

agreement

with

Space

Furthermore, the
Building

Systems

refers to Hercules as an "owner" is not sufficient to support a
legal conclusion that Hercules is subject to the bond statute.
Hercules is not subject to the statute, because the
mobile office units have not been annexed to the Navy's land.
making

that

finding, the trial

court dealt with

In

the purely

factual issue of whether the mobile office units had been annexed
to the land.
The trial court's finding that the mobile office units
were never made part of the Navy's land is not clearly erroneous.
In order to be within the class of persons included within the
scope of the Utah Mechanics1 Lien statute, materials supplied for
-20-
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and found that the equipment manufactured by Mueller and much of
the equipment installed by Dahle constituted personal property
rather

than

improvements

to realty

as

required

by

the Utah

Contractors1 Bond statute, Section 14-2-1r and the Utah Mechanics' Lien statute, Section 38-1-4, and that Mueller and Dahle
therefore held no statutory liens upon the equipment.

In making

its decision, the Mueller court discussed the tripartite test
established in Heiselt Const, Co, v. Garff, 225 P.2d 720, 721
(Utah 1950), in distinguishing between real and personal property
for

the

purposes

of

establishing

whether

a

conversion

has

occurred.
The Mueller court accepted the Heiselt test, making the
same

real/personal

purposes,

property

distinction

657 P.2d at 1283.

the Utah Supreme Court are:

for

statutory

lien

The three factors articulated by
"(1) [the] manner in which the item

is annexed to realty; (2) whether the item is adaptable to the
particular

use of

the realty; and

(3) the

intention of

annexor to make an item a permanent part of the realty."
1283,

Id.

the
at

Each factor, as well as other considerations, is discussed

in more detail below,
A.

Manner Of Annexation,
Addressing

the

annexation

issue, the Mueller

court

found that, although the whey drying equipment was attached to
the real property with ducts, wires, welding, and bolts, mere
physical attachment did not necessarily mean that an item of
-22-
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trial

i-oui't

nor

II.I Lai l i n g

LIUS

the

(onim

i

underground

utilities for the offices complexes (i,et/ sewer, water, power)
and those installing the concrete walkways and asphalt parking
surface would likely have [a cause of action for] failure to
lien claims.1'

obtain a bond and mechanic's

(Brief, p. 26).

Indeed, given the facts of this case, there is no reason to
believe that work by a contracting company would support such
claims at all.

In any event, whether those persons can make

claims or not is of no importance in deciding the case before
this Court.
In the case at bar, the trailers are removable without
extreme difficulty.
by the parties

Indeed, their removability was contemplated

in the express terms of the lease. (R. 640,

p. 53). Furthermore, trailers identical to the trailers in this
litigation were removed from the premises not long before the
trial. (R. 640, p. 120). The units were not placed on permanent
foundations, but

rather,

they

were

placed

on

cinder

blocks

covered by a removable skirting. (R. 640, p. 113). Access to the
units

is provided

through detached concrete stairs. (R. 640,

p. 119, Exhibit 112). The utility hook-ups were provided by the
lessee, were connected

after delivery of

the units, and are

easily disconnected upon removal of the units. (R.> 640, p. 119,
Exhibit 113).

The subject trailers can be removed quite easily

by disconnecting the pipes, reinstalling the wheels, and pulling
them away, just as has been done previously with other trailers.
(R. 640, p. 113).

It certainly cannot be said that the trailers
-24-
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purpose for which the property could be devoted.

The trailers

were used as temporary offices and did not have any special
integration with the real property. (R. 640, p. 54, 106-107).

No

damage is caused to the real property when the trailers are towed
away.

(R. 640r

p. 119, Exhibit

113).

Wagner suggests

that

removal of the office complexes damages the Navy's land, thereby
suggesting that the land is useful for only one purpose.
p. 31.)

(Brief

When the office complexes are removed, however, the

Hercules parking lot simply is no longer bordered by the office
complex but again is bordered by an open field which Hercules or
the Navy will use as it sees fit. (R. 640, p. 114-120, Exhibits
95-117).

Thus, the supreme court's definition of adaptation has

not been met, because the materials supplied by Wagner have
neither become an integrated part of the real property nor a part
of some permanent structure upon the land.

The factual basis of

the trial court's ruling in this regard thus certainly cannot be
assailed.
C.

Intent.
Another

important

factor to consider

in determining

whether the property is personal or real is the intention of the
parties.

According to the Mueller court:
In order to qualify under these [mechanic's
lien] statutes it is necessary that there
must be an annexation to the land . . . and
this must have been done with the intention
of making [the personal property] a permanent
part thereof.
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conclusive evidence of the nature of the property, the lease
could be "one of many items of evidence presented on the issue of
Id.

respondent's intent."

at 1285.

In the instant case, the

transaction documents are strong evidence of the parties1 intent
to retain the personal property

characteristic

of the units.

Initially, Modulaire presented a written quote to Hercules for a
modular office unit complex.

The quote specified both setup and

dismantling charges, evidencing an intent to remove the units at
the expiration of the leases.

(R. 218). The subsequent purchase

order similarly included dismantling and return delivery charges.
(R. 218).
Wagner suggests that the mere fact that Hercules may
choose to un-affix the office complexes in the future is somehow
irrelevant in determining whether those units have been annexed
to the

land.

Hercules,

(Brief

clearly

p.

29.)

expressed

In fact, that
at

the

trial

intention of
and

totally

uncontroverted at the trial, is a major element that the trial
court had to and did consider in reaching its decision.
The intent to retain the personal property characteristic of the units is also evidenced by the temporary manner in
which the trailers were actually placed on the property.

To cre-

ate the temporary annex, a series of trailers was placed on cinder blocks and then held together only by bolts. (R. 640, p. 77).
The trailers created the kind of structure that could hardly
evince a desire for permanency.
-28-
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the

on-sitf
IIM!

structure
I
MI m o b i l e

and

us^d

IIMI.II

nm

home

is

of

permanently affixed when anchored to, and supported by, a permanent foundation.

Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-601(2) (Supp. 1987).

Mobile homes are taxed as real property if (1) the mobile home is
permanently affixed; (2) the owner of the mobile home and the
real property to which the mobile home is affixed files an affidavit

of

affixture;

and

(3)

the

certificate

of

title

or

manufacturer's certificate of origin of the mobile home is surrendered.

Utah Code Ann. §S 59-2-602(1) -

(Supp. 1987).

(3) and 59-2-603

Liens against a mobile home that has been con-

verted to real property must then be perfected in the manner provided for liens on real property.
(Supp. 1987).

Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-602(5)

The trailers in the instant case, however, are

still vehicles or mobile homes.

They have not been converted to

real property by the process set forth by statute.
Wagner

has

relied

on

Thorp

Finance

Corp. v.

F.M.

Wright, 16 Utah 2d 267, 399 P.2d 206 (Utah 1965), claiming that
wheel-less, motorless trailers are not motor vehicles under Utah
law.

This reliance is misplaced, since the nature of the struc-

tures in Thorp is distinguishable from that of the trailers in
the instant case.
71

The trailers in Thorp were transported by

independent wheeled dollies" _Id. at 268, 399 P. 2d at 207, and

were "planted" for use as permanent duplex residences upon arriving at their destination.

_ld. at 268, 399 P.2d at 207. Further-

more, the Thorp court held

that the dealer

transporting

the

structures was not required to register under Utah motor vehicle
-30-
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^

• eed

Id, at S 80•

Hercules obtained permission from the Navy to place

the trailers on the Navy's property
p. 31).

for 24 months. (R. 639,

Thus, the trial court was certainly correct in finding

that the trailers did not become part of the Navy's property.
Utah

law

is

stated in the treatise.

consistent

with

the

general

principle

In Workman v. Henrie, 266 P. 1033 (Utah

1928), the court held that a three-room frame house on a cement
foundation that extended approximately six inches above ground
was the personal property of the builder, despite the fact that
the deed conveying the real property to the adverse party did not
reserve the house and that the adverse party "denied that he had
any knowledge of the builder's interest in the house."
1036.

_Id. at

According to the court:
The rule seems to be well settled that, in
the case of buildings or other improvements
erected on another's land, if built with the
consent of the landowner that they should
remain the personal property of the builder,
the agreement may be oral, for in such case
the character of the building as personalty
is fixed before attachment to the realty, and
the agreement involved no sale of an interest
in the land. . . . Under such circumstances,
the building remains the property of the person annexing it, and may be removed by him.

Id.

at 1035.
The Workman facts are analogous to the facts in the

instant case.

Since the trailers were placed on the land with

the consent of the landowner and under a specific agreement that

-32-
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:

::xa:.j: .

i'he

parties

intended the building to be permanent and only considered its
"flexibility" in the context of opening up parts of the building
to accommodate different uses of the building on the property.
657 P.2d at 1282, 1284.

The parties never considered moving the

building to another site.

The trailers in the case at bar, how-

ever, were placed on cinder blocks, which placement was intended
to be temporary. (R. 235; R. 640, p. 113). Indeed, the testimony
at trial showed that identical trailers, placed on the same type
of temporary cinder block bases, had recently been removed from
the property and that the trailers in question forming Annexes 15
and 16 were soon to be prepared for removal as well. (R. 640,
p. 114-120, Exhibits 69, 95-117).

Thus, the characteristics of

the trailers and the metal building, as well as the intentions of
the parties, differ significantly from Mueller to the instant
case.
Thus, the trial court properly found that under Utah
law the mobile units were not fixtures but retained their character as personal property.

Even if Wagner supplied goods which

were incorporated into these items of personal property, Hercules
is not within the class of persons covered by Utah's Bond statute.

The purpose and application of the bond statute are not

jeopardized by the trial court's findings.

The mechanics' lien

statute and the bond statute will still protect
materialmen

and will

still

prevent

-34-

the unjust

laborers and
enrichment of

unscrupulous property owners.

See, Summary of Utah Real Property

Law, Vol. II, at 484 (1978).
Since the materials supplied by Wagner were not incorporated

into permanent

structures

on

real property

in which

Hercules could realize any benefit, for example from a salef
there is no unjust enrichment to Hercules.

The trailers were

intended to be removed from the Navy's property at the end of the
use period and added no value to the real property whatsoever.
Wagner thus has no remedy under the bond statute.

Any other con-

clusion would stretch that statute beyond the bounds intended by
the legislature.
IV
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
HERCULES IS NOT SUBJECT TO UTAH'S MECHANICS'
LIEN STATUTES, UTAH CODE ANN. S 38-1-1 ET
SEQ.
This appeal raises two issues under the mechanics1 lien
statute.

The first is an issue of law, i.e., whether Hercules

has a sufficient interest in the land to be attached.

The second

is an issue of fact, i.e., whether the mobile office units have
become a part of the Navy's land.
A.

There Is No Interest In The Land On Which The
Court Could Foreclose To Satisfy Wagner's
Lien.
The purpose of Utah's Mechanics' Lien statute is to

prevent

the owners of

land

from having

their

lands

improved

without having to pay the reasonable value for the materials and
-35-

labor provided.

Crane Co. v. Utah Motor Parkr Inc., 8 Utah 2d

413, 416, 335 P.2d 837, 839 (1959); Rio Grande Lumber Co. , 50
Utah at 127, 167 P. at 246.

A mechanic's lien is a judicial

mechanism to obtain for suppliers of goods or services payment
for their

labors and wares.

The statute is not designed to

provide an unpaid contractor with "leverage" to obtain payment
through a threatened or actual suit for foreclosure.

The ulti-

mate issue then with respect to the lien statute is the availability of judicial foreclosure on an interest in real property,
because the remedy in a mechanic's lien action is for the court
to sell the owner's interest in the property in order to satisfy
the lien and the costs incurred by the lienholder.

When a lien

is claimed on property, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-15 provides that
ff

[t]he court shall cause the property to be sold in satisfaction

of

the

liens

and

costs

as

in

the

case

of

foreclosure

of

mortgages. . . . "
1.

Hercules has no alienable interest in the land.

The land on which the mobile office units are located
is owned by the United States Government and is under the jurisdiction of the Navy. (R. 234, Exhibit 2; R. 248-249; R. 640,
p. 104).

However, the United States Navy did not contract for

the lease, placement, or finishing of the units.
is not a party to the contract

involved

The government

in this action, and

Hercules is not acting on behalf of the United States.

Further-

more, the mobile office units for which Wagner supplied materials
-36-

are not public buildings or public works within the scope of the
Miller Act and therefore the Navy's land cannot be the subject of
a lien and a subsequent sherifffs sale, or judicial sale,
Hercules uses the land without any lease, but pursuant
to an Award/Contract, (R. 639, p. 31),

Hercules is allowed to

use the land so long as it uses the land for work on government
contracts, id. Hercules is not the owner of the land and it has
no interest to which a mechanic1s lien could attach.

Nor does it

have an interest which could possibly be sold at a sheriff's sale
or other judicial sale.
Wagner asserts that, because Hercules in some unspecified agreement promised to keep the Navy's property free from
encumbrances, it was thus proven that Hercules had an alienable
interest in the property.
takes fact for inference.

(Brief, p. 17.)

First, Wagner mis-

While reasonable inferences can be

made from the facts presented, the inference suggested by Wagner
is of no avail in this action.

The reference is apparently to

the agreement between Hercules and the Navy.

1

Hercules' promise

In a related case, United States For The Use Of Idaho Western, Inc. v. Modulaire Manufacturing and Hercules, Inc., filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, the plaintiff was a party in the same position as
Wagner, having contracted with Space Building Systems to supply
materials for the same mobile office units, and having not been
paid. In that case, Judge Bruce S. Jenkins dismissed the action
with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, since the plaintiff's claim was barred by the Miller
Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) et seg.
-37-

to avoid encumbrances on the Navy's land could more easily be
understood to prohibit mortgages and other hypothecations than it
could to be an admonition to avoid artesian1s and mechanic's
liens, since the Navy is well protected in regard to the latter
by the Miller act.
Wagner also seems to assert that Hercules has unlimited
use of the land, as if
(Brief p. 17.)

it had a rental agreement or lease.

Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The

trial testimony shows with that Hercules is allowed to use the
land only as long as it uses the land for work on government
contracts. (R. 639, p. 31).
Wagner

asserts

that, because

there

is no

explicit

reference to alienability expressed in the Award/Contract between
Hercules and the Navy, Utah law must thus treat Hercules1 use of
the land as an alienable interest in the land.

It should be

noted first that Wagner bears the burden of proof in this case.
Rather than providing evidence to the lower court that there was
no bar to alienability, which

it might have done through an

expert government witness, it has asked this Court to rely on the
lack

of

evidence

affirmation.

to

Secondly,

support
it

a

attempts

proposition
to

use

the

which

needs

failure

of

Hercules to disprove a negative as a positive for his own case.
Since Wagner has failed

to provide the necessary showing of

affirmative facts disputing the trial court's Finding of Fact,
the trial court's Findings of Fact should be upheld.
-38-

All of Wagner's arguments miss the mark.

The issue

here is whether Hercules has an interest which can be alienated
through judicial sale.

The answer is that it has no such inter-

est in the Navyfs land.
Wagner argues that Judge Noel's ruling would contravene
the purpose of the mechanics1 lien and contractors1 bond statutes
and would encourage owners of property to structure their dealings in such a way as to avoid the applicability of the statutes.
But Wagner fails to consider the remote possibility of any such
widespread machinations occurring in the business world.

First,

making missiles for the United States government is an infrequent,

even

rare, business

enterprise.

Second, few of the

companies making missiles for the United States government likely
operate

on government

land.

Third, of

those missile-making

companies operating on United States government land, very few
likely operate in mobile office units.

Finally, even fewer of

those companies are likely to have situations involving subcontractors who do not get paid for their work by a bankrupt contractor and thus attempt to assert a mechanic's lien on the
property.
2.

The argument is without merit.
Hercules1 Interest In The Land Can In No Way
Be Considered A Lease.
It is clear from Utah law that Hercules1 interest can

in no way be considered a lease.

In its Brief, Wagner asserts

that although neither Hercules nor the trial court term Hercules'
-39-

interest in the subject land as a lease under the Use Agreement,
the law clearly does.
for a valid lease:

Wagner states four factors that must exist

(1) A binding contract in compliance with the

statute of fraud; (2) Possession by the tenant; (3) Legal title
in the landlord; and (4) A leasehold that is capable of being
granted.

Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol. II at 565-66

(1978).

Wagner asserts that all of these elements for a lease

are satisfied in the present case.
how they are satisfied.

But Wagner fails to explain

The record is clear, however, that at

least the second factor, possession by the tenant, has not been
satisfied.

Hercules is using the Navyfs land pursuant to its

Award/Contract, and has the right to use the land only so long as
it uses it to work on government contracts.

However, Hercules

does not have legal possession of the land, which is necessary
for a valid lease to exist.

"The concept of where legal title

remains is important in distinguishing a lease from other legal
relationships.

Likewise it is important in determining who has

possession rights.

For example, the landlord/tenant relationship

is distinguished from the licensor-licensee relationship in that
the licensee never gains exclusive possession of the land; he
receives
Hercules1
Hercules

only permission
Use

Agreement

clearly

does

to use
is just

not

have

land."

-40-

it."

Id. at

that, a use

565, note 2.
agreement, and

"exclusive possession

of

the

The

district

court

correctly

found

that

Hercules1

interest in the land is not alienable and that it is not sufficient to be attached under the Utah Mechanics1 Lien statutes,
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1, et seq.

No flood-gate scenario argues

in favor of overturning the ruling.
B.

A Remand For Trial Under The Mechanics1 Lien
Statute Would Avail Wagner Nothing.
Wagner asks this Court to reverse its summary judgment

order and remand for further proceedings in the foreclosure of
the mechanic's lien.

(Brief, p. 35.)

However, if this issue

were remanded, before Wagner could move forward with its foreclosure action, it would have to show that the trailers were annexed
to the land.

The factual issues relating to the annexation of

the trailers have already been fully determined by the trial
court after trial on the issues presented under the bond statute.
The trial court clearly determined that the trailers "are placed
on the Navy's
affixed

to,

Hercules."

land temporarily

annexed

to, or

(R. 627-628).

and are not

adapted

to

the

integrated into,
Navy's

land

by

Therefore, if this Court affirms the

trial court's Finding of Fact with respect to the annexation
issue under the bond statute, there would be no reason to remand
the issues dealing with the mechanic's lien because the facts
will have already been determined against Wagner's position.

-41-

CONCLUSION
The Modulaire trailers leased to Hercules were personal
property and did not become part of the Navy's land by virtue of
Hercules1 contract with Modulaire,

Therefore, this Court should

affirm the trial court's conclusion that the placing of these
leased mobile office units constituting Annexes 15 and 16 on the
Navy's land by Hercules pursuant to its lease with Modulaire did
not

constitute

the

construction,

addition

to, alteration

or

repair of a building, structure, or improvement upon land as
required by Utah's Contractors' Bond statute, Section 14-2-1,
Utah Code Ann. (1986), and that it did not place Hercules within
the class of persons subject to the provisions of Section 14-2-1,
And this Court should affirm the trial court's Judgment dismissing with prejudice Wagner's Complaint.
Hercules

has

no

interest

mechanic's lien would attach.

in the

land

to which

a

Consequently, there is in this

case no remedy under the mechanics' lien statute because there is
no

interest

in the land which

could possibly

sheriff's sale or other judicial sale.

be sold

at a

This Court should there-

fore affirm the district court's finding that Hercules' interest
in the land is not alienable and that it is not sufficient to be
attached under Utah's Mechanics' Lien statute, Utah Code Ann. $
38-1-1,

et, seg. , and

this Court

should

affirm

the district

court's Order dismissing with prejudice Wagner's First Claim for
Relief in its Complaint.
-42-

DATED this /^^dav of June, 1989.

M. EbSGANTB-^
MARK S. WEBBER
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondent
Hercules, Inc.
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ADDENDUM A
Utah Code Annotated S 14-2-1 et seg. (1986)
14-2-1.

Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.

The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the construction, addition
to, alteration or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract price,
with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful
performance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished, equipment and materials rented, and labor performed under
the contract. This bond runs to the owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear. Any person who has furnished
or rented any equipment or materials, or performed labor for or
upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for which payment has not been made, has a direct right of action against the
sureties upon such bond for the reasonable value of the rented
materials or equipment furnished, for the reasonable value of the
materials furnished, or for labor performed, not exceeding the
prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after
the completion, abandonment, or default in the performance of the
work provided for in the contract.
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested,
upon request.
14-2-2. Failure to require bond - Direct liability - Limitation
of actions.
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter,
who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to
exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable
to all persons who have furnished materials or performed labor
under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials
furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case
the prices agreed upon. Actions to recover on such liability
shall be commenced within one year from the last date the last
materials were furnished or the labor performed.
14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics and materialmen Attorney's fee.
In any action brought upon the bond provided for under
this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court, which shall
be taxed as costs in the action.
-44-

14-2-4.

Exceptions - Mortgagees, beneficiaries, trustees.

Nothing in this chapter requires a mortgagee under a
mortgage or a beneficiary or trustee under a deed of trust to
obtain the bond described in § 14-2-lf or imposes any liability
upon a mortgagee, beneficiary, or trustee who has not obtained
such a bond.
Utah Code Annotated S 38-1-3 (1974 and Supp. 1986)
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien - What may be attached - Lien on
ores mined.
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials for the
prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs,
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost,
surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service,
performed labor or furnished or rented materials or equipment for
the value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials
or equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his
authority as an agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property, but the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or
deposit, whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the
purposes of this chapter include products mined and excavated
while the same remain upon the premises included within the
lease.
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ADDENDUM B
Contractual Relationships Between The
Parties Involved In This Action

•* HERCULES

MODULAIRE
(Modulaire contracted with Space
Building Systems to finish the
interior of the trailers using
demountable partitioning.)
i

SPACE BUILDING SYSTEMS
(Space Building Systems
contracted with Wagner to
supply materials used in
finishing the interiors of
the trailers.)

JOHN WAGNER ASSOCIATES,
D/B/A GRABBER UTAH
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(Hercules leased the
the trailers from
Modulaire,)

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
HERCULES, INC. to the following on this /^J^day of June, 1989:
Darrel J. Bostwick
Walstad & Babcock, P.C.
254 West 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

-TrtUifaiu^
242:052489A

_47_

